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REFORMING THE HIGH-STAKES GAMBLE OF
COVERT GOVERNMENT SEIZURES
Jonathan Witmer-Rich*
ABSTRACT

In a covert government seizure, police secretly enter a home when no
one is present and seize contraband, often staging the scene to look like a
burglary. These covert seizures are authorized by delayed notice search
warrants. This Article identifies two serious problems with this practice and
proposes reforms.
The first problem is that a successful covert seizure will likely provoke
violent retaliation against innocent third parties. If the target of the covert
seizure-say a drug dealer-believes someone has stolen a valuable drug
stash, the dealer will seek to kill or harm whomever they believe conducted the
burglary. The statute authorizing covert seizures does nothing to address this
grave danger to the safety of third parties, some of whom are wholly innocent
bystanders.
The second, deeper problem relates to why police conduct covert
seizures at all. According to the government, covert seizures allow police to
seize evidence while maintaining the secrecy of an ongoing investigation,
permitting that investigation to continue. But in many cases, that rationale is
suspect. Law enforcement agents are not nai"ve. They know that covertly
burglarizing a drug stash might quickly lead to violent retaliation. This means
that often they also know that they cannot wait long before arresting the
suspects.
Ifpolice know that a covert seizure is likely to prompt violent retaliation,
thus necessitating quick intervention, why conduct the seizure covertly in the
first place? In these cases, the answer cannot be what the government tells us
to allow law enforcement additional days, weeks, or months to continue the
investigation-because the government knows that this will be impossible.

* Joseph C. Hostetler-BakerHostetler Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law, Cleveland State University; J.D., University of Michigan School of Law;
B.A., Goshen College. Thanks to the many individuals who have graciously commented
on drafts of this Article, including participants in the CrimFest 2018 Conference, in
particular Eric J. Miller, Karen Newirth, Lawrence Rosenthal, and Ric Simmons. Thanks
to Bomi Boehnlein for excellent research assistance.
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This suggests a different, hidden rationale for covert seizures, one that is
far more troubling and constitutionally objectionable. In conducting some
covert seizures, law enforcement may simply intend to poke the hornet's
nest-provoke an immediate reaction from the suspects, leading to additional,
more serious criminal charges beyond those supported by the pre-existing
conduct. This hidden practice should be recognized and expressly forbidden.
This Article proposes several reforms to the warrant process: giving
magistrates a more robust oversight role over covert seizures, requiring law
enforcement to identify and mitigate risks of harm created by covert seizures,
and prohibiting the use of covert seizures as a tool to provoke additional
criminal conduct.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction to Covert Seizures and Delayed Notice Search
Warrants ................................................................................................. 405
II. The Predictable Dangers of Covert Seizures .................................... .410
III. Justifications for Covert Seizures: Extending a Complex
Investigation, or Poking the Hornet's Nest? ..................................... .417
IV. Fourth Amendment Limitations on Covert Seizures ...................... .422
V. Using the Warrant Process to Regulate Covert Searching .............. 429
Covert government seizures are a high-risk, high-reward gamble. Law
enforcement officers, armed with a delayed notice search warrant, secretly
enter a home when no one is present and seize contraband. 1 They stage the
scene to look like a burglary, keeping the government investigation secret so
it may continue and hopefully unravel more of the complex conspiracy2 
1. See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2); Brett A. Shumate, From "Sneak and Peek" to
"Sneak and Steal": Section 213 of the USA Patriot Act, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 203, 209
10 (2006); Jonathan Witmer-Rich, When Cops 'Steal' Drugs, the Results Can Spin Out of
Control, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/opinion/police
drugs-warrants.html.
2. See, e.g., DeArmon v. Burgess, 388 F.3d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 2004) ("According to
appellants, the officers broke entry doors and locks on interior doors, damaged drywall
and furniture, and seized a firearm, doorknobs and locks, photographs, personal papers,
and jewelry."); United States v. Howard, 489 F.3d 484, 488 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing
officers "conducting the search of the vehicle to make it appear as though the vehicle
had been vandalized while it was left unattended on the side of the Thruway. They broke
a pool cue found in the back of the car, presumably belonging to the vehicle's occupants,
and used it to pry open the glove compartment, damaging the glove compartment and
making it appear as if there had been an attempted break-in."); United States v. Patel,
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this, at least, is how the government describes the purpose of covert
seizures. 3
The danger is evident. When, for example, members of a drug
conspiracy discover that someone has stolen their drug stash, they will be out
for blood, seeking retaliation against whomever they believe conducted the
burglary. 4 This is the first problem with covert seizures: they create
predictable risks of violent retaliation. The statute authorizing this practice
does nothing to address this grave danger to the safety of third parties, some
of whom are wholly innocent bystanders. 5
The second problem is more insidious. Law enforcement agents are not
na'ive. They are well aware that covertly burglarizing a drug stash might
quickly lead to violent retaliation. 6 This calls into question the standard
government narrative about the purpose of covert seizures in the first place.
Police know that violence is a high risk after a covert seizure. 7 This means
that in many cases they also know that they cannot wait long before arresting
the suspects. 8
This reality substantially undermines the purported rationale for the
covert seizure-to allow the investigation to continue for some meaningful
period of time. 9 Stated differently, if police know that a covert seizure is
likely to prompt violent retaliation, thus necessitating quick intervention,
why conduct the seizure covertly in the first place? In these cases, the answer
cannot be what the government tells us-to allow law enforcement
additional days, weeks, or months to continue the investigation- because
the government knows that this will be impossible. 10 Why not just conduct a
regular search and seizure-arresting the targets during raid-rather than
conducting a risky covert seizure that may precipitate imminent violence?

579 F. App'x 449, 463 (6th Cir. 2014) ("On April 28, 2011, the DEA executed a delayed
notice search warrant at the apartment of Chirag Soni, who also stored boxes of billed
but-not dispensed medications for Patel. The DEA made this entry look like a break-in
and theft.").
3. See infra Part III, notes 130-35, 151.
4. See infra Part II, notes 67-99.
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Miranda, 425 F.3d 953, 956 (11th Cir. 2005).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See discussion infra Part III.
10. See id.
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This suggests a different, hidden rationale for covert seizures, one that
is far more troubling and constitutionally objectionable. In conducting some
covert seizures, law enforcement may simply intend to poke the hornet's
nest-provoke an immediate reaction from the suspects, leading to
additional, more serious criminal charges beyond those supported by the
pre-existing conduct. 11 In essence, law enforcement officers seek to deploy
an exceptional type of search warrant (a delayed notice warrant) in order to
sow chaos, and to do so in a way that creates a predictable danger to third
parties. 12
This hidden practice should be recognized and expressly forbidden. To
the extent police can use covert searches and seizures to meaningfully
prolong an investigation, that legitimate government interest may outweigh
the dangers to others, so long as the investigation is sufficiently important
and measures are in place to minimize the risk. 13 But to the extent police use
covert seizures simply to provoke suspects into violent reaction, the
government interest is less compelling and does not justify the deliberate
creation of danger to third parties. 14
Part I introduces the practice of covert seizures with delayed notice
search warrants, briefly examining the history and current legal regulation
of delayed notice warrants. Part II discusses the obvious danger of successful
covert seizures-the risk that the targets will engage in violent self-help
against innocent third parties they suspect of having stolen their contraband.
Part III analyzes the government's justification for covert search and
seizure-allowing law enforcement to prolong a complex investigation. It
questions the validity of that justification in the context of covert seizures,
and instead suggests that covert seizures may often be driven by an unspoken
and more dangerous goal: to provoke suspects into violent criminal activity. 15
Part IV analyzes the Fourth Amendment principles implicated by covert
seizures, and Part V proposes how courts might regulate this high-risk
practice through the warrant process.
This Article proposes several reforms to the warrant process: giving
magistrates a more robust oversight role over covert seizures, requiring law
enforcement to identify and mitigate risks of violence created by covert

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See, e.g., Miranda, 425 F.3d at 956.
See id.
See discussion infra Part III.
See id.
See id.
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seizures, and prohibiting the use of covert seizures as a tool to provoke
additional criminal conduct.
I. INTRODUCTION TO COVERT SEIZURES AND DELAYED NOTICE SEARCH
WARRANTS

Consider the following two accounts of stealing a drug stash:
The Case of Omar Little. Omar Little was a stick-up boy-he robbed
drug dealers in Baltimore. 16 One night, Omar and his crew stole a big stash
of crack cocaine from Avon Barksdale. 17 Predictably, Avon was out for
revenge. 18 Wallace, one of Avon's street dealers, saw Brandon (Omar's
accomplice and paramour) at a corner store one night. 19 Avon's crew
grabbed Brandon, tortured him to death, and left his body on display for the
neighborhood to see what happens when you steal from Avon. 20 In Avon's
words: "I want that motherf--er on display. I'm gonna send a message to
the courtyard about this motherf--er. So people know we ain't playin." 21
The Case ofthe Cleveland Meth Robbery. In March 2018, a group broke
into a building on Olde Eight Road in a rural suburb outside Cleveland,
Ohio. 22 The building housed a meth lab, and they stole 82 pounds of crystal
meth. 23 The drug dealers running the lab predictably freaked out. 24 They
decided it must have been an inside job. 25 After getting the green light from
their Mexican supplier to kill the suspected thief, they agreed to "knock his
head in. " 26
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

The Wire: Old Cases (HBO television broadcast June 23, 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
21. Id.
22. 140 Pounds of Meth Seized from Boston Heights Warehouse; Believed to be
Largest Bust in Ohio History, WKYC (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.wkyc.com
/article/news/local/summit-county/140-pounds-of-meth-seized-from-boston-heights-war
ehouse-believed-to-be-largest-bust-in-ohio-history/95-534636575 [https://perma.cc/9SB
5-A73J].
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Cleveland Man and Two Mexican Nationals Charged in Federal Court After
Agents Seize 140 Pounds of Methamphetamine; Bust Comes Days After Seizure of 44
pounds of Heroin in Akron, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.justice.gov
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There are two important differences between these stories. The first
story is fictional (from HBO's The Wire), whereas the second story
happened in real life. 27 In addition, the nature of the stick-up crew was very
different. 28 In the first case, Omar Little led a small band of thieves who
operated locally in Baltimore. 29 The second break-in was conducted by a
much larger, more powerful organization that steals drug stashes all over the
country and has done so for years: the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). 30
The Cleveland-area break-in was conducted by a joint federal-state
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, including Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents and state and local police. 31 Officers
sought a delayed notice search warrant to permit them to break into the
building secretly, when no one was present, and seize any drugs and stage
the scene to look like a burglary. 32
Neither the warrant or the affidavit requesting covert search and
seizure authority said anything about what would happen if the plan
worked-if the drug dealers fell for the ruse that someone (not law
enforcement) had stolen their drugs. 33 The documents did not mention or

/usao-ndoh/pr/cleveland-man-and-two-mexican-nationals-charged-federal-court-after
agents-seize-140 [https://perma.cc/TWC6-7R87] [hereinafter Cleveland Man].
27. See id.; The Wire: Old Cases, supra note 16.
28. The Wire: Old Cases, supra note 16.
29. Id.
30. See Cleveland Man, supra note 26.
31. Id.
32. Although the DOJ press release states that investigators "executed a delayed
notice search warrant" on the property, this is inaccurate. Id. While the affidavit
requested authority for a delayed notice search, the warrant itself did not authorize
delayed notice. Compare Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant, sworn and subscribed
on May 24, 2018, 32-34 (on file with author) (setting forth a "request for delayed notice"
for thirty days, including "the seizure of contraband ... if there is reasonable necessity
for the seizure"), with Search Warrant for 7592 Olde Eight Road, Hudson, Summit
County, Ohio (on file with author) (failing to mention or authorize covert entry, covert
seizure, or delayed notice, and instead expressly requiring that the agent serve a copy of
the warrant and a written inventory on the targets of the search). Notwithstanding this
lack of warrant authority, investigators treated the warrant as a delayed notice warrant,
and executed a covert search and seizure. The government's response to a defense
motion to suppress acknowledges this, conceding that the language in the warrant
"contravenes the request in the affidavit to delay notice of the execution of the warrant."
United States v. Johnson, Government Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion
to Suppress, filed Mar. 6, 2019, at 6.
33. See Cleveland Man, supra note 26.
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address the risk that the drug dealers might decide to kill the suspected
thief. 34 They did not address what steps, if any, law enforcement would take
to mitigate that risk. 35 No i~dependent judge was involved in weighing this
risk to public safety or deciding whether the risk was worth the government
interest in this particular investigation. 36
The investigators had wiretap orders on phone lines being used by the
suspects and thus heard them discuss getting the "green light" to kill. 37 The
agreement to "knock his head in" is a quote from the wiretap. 38 Fortunately,
police promptly arrested the suspects before they carried out the murder. 39
This practice-covert seizures with delayed notice search warrants-is
a high-risk, high-reward gamble by law enforcement. Covert seizures give
rise to a predictable risk of danger to innocent third parties. 40 Currently, the
law authorizing the practice does nothing to address this risk or require law
enforcement to justify or mitigate the risk. 41 Because covert seizures create
a serious risk of danger to others, they implicate the privacy and security
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 42 Unless adequately limited, covert
seizures are constitutionally "unreasonable."
Covert seizures of physical evidence - the specific focus of this
Article-are a subset of covert government searches of various kinds. 43 This
Article focuses on the particular risks associated with covert seizures of
evidence or contraband, in contrast with the issues associated with the
broader universe of covert government surveillance, much of which does not
involve a secret seizure of evidence or contraband.
It is worth briefly situating covert seizures of physical evidence into the
broader universe of covert government surveillance. Many types of
government surveillance are conducted secretly, without the target's
knowledge. 44 This surveillance includes things such as secretly tracking a
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See id.
Id.
See generally id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See, e.g., id.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a.
See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3103a.
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Carpenter v. United States,
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suspect's location using GPS 45 or cell site location46 or installing secret video
cameras to record suspects either out in the open47 or inside a home or
business. 48 The government sometimes installs a wiretap to listen in on
phone calls49 or searches a suspect's e-mails, text messages, or Internet
search history. 50 The government can even physically enter a home or
business covertly-with a delayed notice search warrant-simply to look
around and take photographs, without physically disturbing the scene or
physically removing anything. 51 These covert physical intrusions have
traditionally been referred to as "sneak and peek" searches. 52
For searches conducted with a search warrant, criminal rules of
procedure generally require that the suspect receive notice of the search at
the time it is conducted. 53 In some cases, however, criminal rules or statutes
permit police to "delay" this notice-to conduct the search or surveillance

138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
45. E.g., Jones, 565 U.S. 400.
46. E.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206.
47. Compare United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 287-88 (6th Cir. 2016)
(holding that installation of a pole camera to monitor defendant's rural home over a ten
week period did not intrude into the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy and
thus was not a search under the Fourth Amendment), with State v. Jones, 903 N.W.2d
101, 113-14 (S.D. 2018) (holding that installation of a pole camera directed at
defendant's home over a two-month period intruded into the defendant's reasonable
expectation of privacy and thus constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment).
48. E.g., Scott Zamost, Hannah Kliot & Bianca Fortis, Robert Kraft Case Reveals
How Police Can Secretly Install Cameras Inside a Private Business, CNBC (Mar. 21,
2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/14/robert-kraft-case-shows-how-police-use
hidden-cameras-to-get-evidence.html [https://perma.cc/84M3-BHEP].
49. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520.
50. See, e.g., State v. Maranger, 110 N.E.3d 895, 917 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018)
(discussing a search warrant authorizing a search for "e-mail, text messages and internet
search history," among other items).
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 3013a; United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1453 (9th Cir.
1986) (involving a warrant in which "the agents were permitted to enter the home while
no one else was there, look around, and leave without removing anything").
52. See Jonathan Witmer-Rich, The Rapid Rise ofDelayed Notice Searches, and the
Fourth Amendment "Rule Requiring Notice", 41 PEPP. L. REV. 509, 511 n.4 (2014)
(discussing history of "sneak and peek" terminology) [hereinafter Witmer-Rich, The
Rapid Rise].
53. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(l)(B), (C) (requiring officer executing the warrant
provide the warrant and a completed inventory to the owner of the premises, if possible);
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 41(D)(l) (similar).
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secretly, only notifying the suspect weeks or months later. 54 In particular, one
provision of the USA PATRIOT Act, passed in the wake of September 11,
2001, sets forth statutory standards for the issuance of "delayed notice search
warrants." 55 Delayed notice search warrants expressly authorize covert
searches and, sometimes, covert seizures-with notice given only weeks or
months after the search.56
This Article focuses on the types of covert searches that also involve
seizures-physical intrusions into a home or business in which law
enforcement officers seize physical evidence or contraband. These cases do
not merely involve covert collection of information, but a legally authorized
government seizure of physical property. 57 While much has been said about
the risks of covert government surveillance generally, the practice of covert
seizures carries unique risks that warrant particular attention and concern. 58
There is little data available about the frequency of covert seizures.
Congress did create a data reporting requirement that applies generally to
all delayed notice search warrants, 59 and thus, the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts releases an annual delayed notice search warrant report. 60

54. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b).
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a; Witmer-Rich, The Rapid Rise, supra note 52, at 517-31
(recounting the history of covert searches and the enactment of the delayed notice search
warrant law).
56. See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a.
57. In the case of digital surveillance, it is unclear whether the mere copying of data
constitutes a "seizure" of that data. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (copying
serial numbers does not constitute a seizure of that information); Note, Digital
Duplications and the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1046, 1048 (2016) ("[U]ntil
very recently, [the caselaw] tended to suggest that the Fourth Amendment had no
application to duplication because it is neither a search nor a seizure. If the government
just 'copies' the data, without looking at it, then there is no invasion of privacy."); Paul
Ohm, The Fourth Amendment Right to Delete, 119 HARV. L. REV. 10 (2005) (arguing
that duplication of data is a seizure because it interferes with the owner's "right to
delete" the data); Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Seizures of Computer Data, 119
YALE L.J. 700 (2010) (arguing that "copying data 'seizes' it under the Fourth
Amendment when copying occurs without human observation and interrupts the stream
of possession or transmission").
58. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1934 (2013). DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW (1st ed. 2007).
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(d)(l).
60. See Delayed-Notice Search Warrant Report, U.S. Crs., https://www.uscourts.gov
/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/delayed-notice-search-warrant-report
[https://perma.cc/BB9A-8SZH] (reports for 2007-2020).
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These reports show the total number of delayed notice search warrants
issued under § 3103a, the types of cases in which they are used, and the
number of warrants per judicial district, including denials.61 Unfortunately,
this data is of limited value, because it combines together very different types
of covert surveillance- such as warrants for digital tracking devices,
warrants for covertly accessing e-mail or text messages-in addition to actual
physical intrusion into homes and businesses. 62 The data does not separate
out these different types of searches. 63 In addition, the data does not
separately record covert seizures-delayed notice searches that involve not
only secret entry, but a staged burglary to conceal the physical seizure of
evidence or contraband. 64 Thus, there are no good data on the frequency of
covert seizures, or the types of cases in which they are used.
Accordingly, the only currently available evidence of covert seizures
are news reports or judicial opinions discussing the practice. 65 A number of
those cases are discussed in Part II, which turns to consider the predictable
dangers that accompany covert seizures of physical evidence.
II. THE PREDICTABLE DANGERS OF COVERT SEIZURES

The danger created by covert seizures is clear, and is illustrated by the
Ohio case discussed above. When drug dealers believe someone has stolen
large amounts of their product, they are likely to resort to violent self-help:
figuring out who they believe stole the drugs, and killing or injuring that
them. The targets of the Ohio meth lab seizure quickly got the "green light"
to kill the individual they suspected of the theft. 66
A second example of this danger is illustrated by a covert seizure case
that occurred in Oregon. 67 In that case, police were not able to keep events
from spinning out of their control, and it was only good fortune that
61. Id.; see, e.g., Delayed-Notice Search Warrant Report 2020, U.S. Crs. (Sept. 30,
2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/delayed-notice-search-warrant-report
2020 [https://perma.cc/N7MR-S25Q].
62. See Witmer-Rich, The Rapid Rise, supra note 52, at 539-49.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 539-42.
65. See discussion infra Part IL
66. See Cleveland Man, supra note 26.
67. See Maxine Bernstein, Secret Drug Raid by Feds Backfires in Portland:
"Someone Could Have Been Killed," OREGONIAN (Apr. 15, 2018),
https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2018/04/secret_drug_raid_by_feds_backf.html#in
cart_target2box_default_ [https://perma.cc/F27W-76P5].
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prevented the covert seizure from resulting in the death of an innocent
bystander. 68 A federal-state joint task force obtained a delayed notice search
warrant to seize about 500 pounds of marijuana from a storage facility in
Portland. 69 After covertly seizing the drugs, investigators instructed a
manager at the storage facility to call the drug dealers and tell them someone
had broken into their storage unit. 70 Police then followed the dealers as they
went to the storage facility. 71
At some point, police surveillance apparently broke down. 72 Several of
the conspirators, after seeing that the drugs were in fact gone, kidnapped the
manager of the storage facility and held him at gunpoint. 73 Police presumably
missed this event, as they did nothing to step in and prevent the kidnapping
or rescue the manager. 74 The drug dealers bound the manager's hands and
feet with duct tape, went through his pockets, and took his keys. 75 They
interrogated him at gunpoint, demanding to know what had happened to the
drugs.76
He told them the truth- that he had discovered the door of the storage
unit ripped off the track and reported the break-in to the police. 77 He also
shared with them something even stranger: "I think the police did [it]. That
is what my boss said ....[M]y boss said it wasn't a break in." 78 The dealers,
apparently spooked, left the manager tied up in the storage facility and fled
to the airport, where they were eventually arrested by law enforcement
officers. 79 Fortunately, the dealers did not shoot the manager before they
fled. 80
Several judicial decisions involving delayed notice search warrants
have recognized the danger created by covert seizures, although no court has

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

73.
74.

75.
76.
77.

78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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yet focused on this risk as a reason the practice might violate the Fourth
Amendment. 81

.

In United States v. Espinoza, the court granted a motion to suppress the
fruits of a covert search. 82 The court's analysis primarily focused on the
warrant's facial deficiency- the police had requested a delayed notice search
warrant, but the actual warrant did not authorize a covert search. 83 At the
end of the opinion, however, the court also raised the potential dangers of a
covert seizure of contraband. 84 When the officers covertly seized the drugs
in the Espinoza case, they "left a California license plate in order to divert
any suspicion from law enforcement and toward other individuals." 85 The
court observed that this tactic "has the dangerous potential of injuring
innocent third persons. When an individual discovers that others have been
on their property uninvited, there exists a natural desire to learn who the
intruder was." 86 This "creates the potential for innocent people being injured
because the owners of the property may incorrectly blame and sanction in
some way a person innocent of the seizure. " 87
Indeed, just like in the Ohio case, the investigators in Espinoza had a
wiretap in place that recorded the suspects discussing this issue: "The
transcripts of recorded telephone conversations demonstrate that the
Riveras had focused on the brother of Ms. Espinoza exposing him to danger
of injury." 88 The court in Espinoza held that the search was invalid on other
grounds, and thus did not opine on whether this risk might independently
invalidate the search warrant. 89

81. See generally United States v. Espinoza, No. CR-05-2075-7-EFS, 2005 WL
3542519, at *5 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 2005); United States v. Miranda, 425 F.3d 953, 956
(11th Cir. 2005).
82. Espinoza, 2005 WL 3542519, at *5.
83. Id. at *4-5. In the search warrant affidavit, the investigators had requested a
delayed notice search warrant under § 3103a. The warrant itself, however, did not
actually authorize delayed notice. Id.
84. Id. at *5.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at *4-5.
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In United States v. Miranda, the Eleventh Circuit briefly discussed a
covert seizure with a delayed notice search warrant.9<l The legality of the
covert seizure was not at issue in Miranda, so the court did not address the
lawfulness of the tactic; the decision simply serves as another illustration of
how covert seizures operate. 91 In Miranda, police investigating a drug
conspiracy developed probable cause to search a particular house for
methamphetamine. 92 Police obtained a delayed notice search warrant and
conducted the search at 4:45 a.m., when no one was present, seizing three
pounds of methamphetamine.93
According to the court, this covert seizure was designed to provoke the
suspects into additional criminal activity: "By staging a burglary, the agents
hoped to precipitate activity within the Cuevas conspiracy that would provide
additional evidence of criminal conduct. "94
The tactic was successful:
The ruse had the desired effect. Mr. Cuevas discussed the apparent
theft of the methamphetamine from the 499 Alcott Street stash house
with Jesus Alvear Uribe.... Mr. Uribe suggested that Mr. Mojica was
the thief. Mr. Cuevas suspected that the culprit was a man who had been
employed to wash the methamphetamine at the 499 Alcott Street stash
house. After the entry into the 499 Alcott Street stash house and the
apparent theft of methamphetamine, Mr. Cuevas moved his
methamphetamine and cocaine operation to Apartment 29G. 95

The Miranda court does not discuss this issue further. The facts,
however, illustrate the concern. 96 Similar to the Ohio case, the Miranda
suspects apparently decided that the theft was an inside job perpetrated by
a lower-level participant in the conspiracy. 97 While the court does not say, it
is reasonable to assume that Mr. Mojica-the suspected thief-then became
a potential target for violent retaliation. 98

90. United States v. Miranda, 425 F.3d 953, 956 (11th Cir. 2005).
91. See generally id.
92. Id. at 956.
93. Id.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. See id.; Cleveland Man, supra note 26.
98. See Miranda, 425 F.3d at 956.
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The cases above demonstrate that covert seizures often create a
predictable danger of violent retaliation. This is not necessarily true for
every covert seizure- the nature and degree of the risk created depends very
much on the targets of the investigation and the nature of their criminal
activity. 99 In some contexts, violent retaliation seems much less likely. 100
For example, in United States v. Patel, the government conducted a
lengthy investigation into a suspected health care fraud conspiracy. 101 The
health care fraud involved, among other things, prescribing expensive
medications that were billed to Medicare or Medicaid but never distributed
to patients. 102 Instead, the participants in the fraud would order these
medications, store them for a period of time, and then either return them or
sell them on the black market.103
The investigation involved a variety of tactics, including a Title III
wiretap that began in January 2011 and a delayed notice search and seizure
conducted in April 2011. 104 The April covert seizure targeted "the billed-but
not-dispensed medications," and the DEA seized medications and "made
this entry look like a break-in and theft." 105 Following this covert seizure, the
government continued monitoring the Title III wiretap, picking up
incriminating conversations. 106 The investigation continued until August
2011, when the targets were finally arrested. 107
The Patel opinion does not focus on the legality of the delayed notice
search and seizure, but simply mentions it in passing as part of the evidence
showing guilt. 108 However, the nature of the investigation, as well as the
timing of the covert seizure and later arrests, suggests that this is an example
of a covert seizure that did not create an imminent risk of violence. 109 Unlike
the examples given above, the arrests in the Patel case came months after
the covert seizure of the medications. 110 This suggests that the delayed notice
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See id.
See, e.g., United States v. Patel, 579 F. App'x 449, 463-64 (6th Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id. at 451.
Id.
Id. at 455, 463-64.
Id. at 463.
Id. at 463-64.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 463.
See id. at 463-64.
Id. at 451, 463.
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search and seizure was used to gather evidence while permitting the
investigation to continue-the standard justification given by the DOJ for
this practice. 111
Moreover, the nature of the conspiracy also suggests violent retaliation
was less likely than in other types of conspiracies. Unlike the Ohio
methamphetamine conspiracy or the Oregon marijuana conspiracy, the
Patel case involved prescription drug fraud. 112 The wiretap makes it clear that
the targets of the "theft" were upset and wanted to find out what had
happened, but there was no evidence that they planned any violent
retaliation. 113 Instead, one conspirator suggested hiring a private investigator
to determine what had occurred. 114 Contrast that with the Ohio
methamphetamine case, in which the targets instead suggested they would
attack the suspected thief and "knock his head in." 115
Accordingly, it seems reasonable to conclude that some types of covert
seizures create a serious risk of harm to others, whereas other covert seizures
do not. 116 A key problem with the covert search and seizure statute is that it
does not address this danger at all, let alone provide any procedure for
differentiating between the two types of cases. 117 A solution to this flaw is
discussed below in Part V.
For those covert seizures that do present serious risks of violent
retaliation, there is every reason to believe that law enforcement officials are
aware of those dangers. 118 Covert searches and seizures are often conducted
by special police units, often a joint federal-state drug task force, that

111. See Delayed Notice Search Warrants: A Vital and Time-Honored Tool for
Fighting Crime, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (Sept. 2004), http://www.justice.gov/dag/patriotact213
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/33M6-AQ24] [hereinafter DNSW White Paper].
112. Patel, 579 F. App'x at 463-64; Cleveland Man, supra note 26; Bernstein, supra
note 67.
113. Patel, 579 F. App'x at 464 ("When Patel told Acharya that boxes had been
stolen from Chirag's place, Acharya wanted to know 'how' and 'who' stole them. Patel
named the person he suspected of committing the theft. In a later call, Acharya asked
Patel the value of the stolen medications and he told her $500,000. Acharya exclaimed,
'Oh, my God. Can you not catch him?' Patel answered, 'I am trying to now. I am going
to search for a private detective and see how we do that and where it is."').
114. Id.
115. See Cleveland Man, supra note 26.
116. Compare id., with Patel, 579 F. App'x at 463-64.
117. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3103a.
118. See, e.g., Cleveland Man, supra note 26.
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conduct long-term investigations into criminal conspiracies: drug
conspiracies, terrorism conspiracies, human trafficking rings, and so on. 119
Far from being na'ive about the dangers posed by the targets of their
investigations, these law enforcement agencies are keenly aware of their
targets' potential for violence. 120
Accordingly, careful law enforcement agencies should deliberately
plan covert seizure operations with safeguards and procedures to mitigate
the risks of harm to third parties. That said, several related problems remain.
First, the decision to engage in this high-risk (and potentially high
reward) investigative tactic is made by law enforcement officers actively
engaged in the criminal investigation, rather than by a neutral third party
who might more objectively weigh the risks and benefits. 121
Second, because the dangers of a covert seizure are not part of the
warrant application process, there is no uniform national standard that law
enforcement agencies are required to meet. 122 Some agencies or local offices
may do an entirely responsible job of evaluating risks to third parties and
deploying this tactic only when necessary in a truly important investigation.
Other agencies or local offices may have looser practices.
Third, the danger created by covert seizures calls into question the
actual purpose of this tactic. If law enforcement agencies know that a staged
burglary will predictably give rise to violent retribution, they will likely be
compelled to intervene and arrest suspects within hours of a covert seizure. 123
This means, in turn, that even when a covert seizure is successful, police will

119. For example, the Ohio meth lab raid described above was conducted by an
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force including agents from the DEA, the
Lake County Narcotics Agency, Cuyahoga County Sheriff's Office, Euclid Police
Department, Aurora Police Department, Summit County Sheriff's Office, Boston
Heights Police Department, Cleveland Heights Police Department, Cleveland Division
of Police, Ashtabula County Sheriff's Office, Ohio State Highway Patrol, Ohio BCI, and
U.S. Border Patrol. See id. Similarly, the Oregon marijuana raid described above was
part of a months-long investigation into marijuana trafficking involving the DEA,
Homeland Security Investigations, the FBI, Port of Portland police, and the Multnomah
County Sheriff's Office. Bernstein, supra note 67.
120. See Bernstein, supra note 67.
121. See, e.g., United States v. Espinoza, No. CR-05-2075-7-EFS, 2005 WL 3542519,
at *5 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 2005).
122. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3103a.
123. See Cleveland Man, supra note 26.

Reforming Covert Government Seizures

2021]

417

not be able to continue their investigation for an extended period of time. 124
The ability to continue the investigation (while seizing contraband or
evidence) is, supposedly, the key benefit of a covert seizure. 125 But if this
benefit is regularly short-circuited, then why conduct the covert seizure in
the first place? Part III now turns to address this question.
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COVERT SEIZURES: EXTENDING A COMPLEX
INVESTIGATION OR POKING THE HORNET'S NEST?

Government officials defending delayed notice search warrants
ordinarily explain the tactic as follows: in some cases, the government has a
very strong interest in being able to acquire important information or
evidence while continuing the investigation without tipping off the suspect. 126
Ordinarily, law enforcement officers must choose one of two options: (1)
conduct a search and seizure, thereby securing evidence and contraband, but
at the cost of notifying the suspects of the investigation; or (2) continue the
investigation covertly, thereby risking the loss of evidence or contraband. 127
A covert search and seizure gives police a way out of this dilemma- a chance
to have their cake and eat it too. 128
The DOJ has argued that covert searching is a "vital aspect" of its
counterterrorism and criminal law enforcement efforts. 129 In a 2004 White
Paper, the DOJ explained that the difficulty of choosing between conducting
a search and continuing an investigation "is especially acute in terrorism
investigations, where the slightest indication of government interest can lead
a loosely connected cell to dissolve, only to re-form at some other time and
place in pursuit of some other plot. " 130
The DOJ asked the following:
Should investigators who receive a tip of an imminent attack
decline to search the suspected terrorist's residence for evidence of
when and where the attack will occur because notice of the search would

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See id.
See discussion infra Part III.
See DNSW White Paper, supra note 111.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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prevent law enforcement agents from learning the identities of the
remainder of the terrorist's cell, leaving it free to plan future attacks? 131

Covert search and seizure is not limited to the counter-terrorism
context, however, and in fact is much more commonly used in drug
investigations.132 In that context, the DOJ has justified the need for covert
search and seizure with the following example:
Consider, for example, a case in which law enforcement received a
tip that a large shipment of heroin was about to be distributed and
obtained a warrant to seize the drugs. To preserve the investigation's
confidentiality and yet prevent the drug's distribution, investigators
would prefer to make the seizure appear to be a theft by rival drug
traffickers. Should investigators be forced to let the drugs hit the streets
because notice of a seizure would disclose the investigation and destroy
any chance of identifying the drug ring's leaders and dismantling the
operation-or to make the alternative choice to sacrifice the
investigation to keep dangerous drugs out of the community? 133

Thus, the core justification for covert search and seizure authority is
this premise: in some cases, law enforcement has a sufficiently compelling
need to both seize evidence (e.g., to prevent large amounts of drugs from
entering a community) and also continue an investigation (e.g., to detect and
disrupt the entire conspiracy rather than only the immediate suspects).
Focusing on the particular context of covert seizures (staged
burglaries), it is not clear whether this justification actually makes sense in
all cases. As noted above, law enforcement officers conducting these
investigations are not naive, and they are generally aware of the risk of harm
to others created by a staged burglary.134
This means that law enforcement officials are also often aware that
once they conduct a covert seizure, it is unlikely that they will be able to
continue an investigation for any substantial period of time.13 5 When violent
retaliation is a likely response, police will not be able to keep the

131. Id.
132. See Witmer-Rich, The Rapid Rise, supra note 52, at 534-36 figs. 2 & 3 (showing
that "most delayed notice search warrants-about 75%-are used for drug
investigations").
133. DNSW White Paper, supra note 111.
134. See, e.g., Cleveland Man, supra note 26.
135. See id.
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investigation going for weeks or months after a covert seizure. Instead, they
are likely to have only hours or days before they will need to step in and
ensure they prevent any harm to third parties. 136 The cases discussed above
illustrate this dynamic.131
Stated differently: the more responsible law enforcement is about
preventing violence following a covert seizure, the less useful a covert
seizure becomes as a tool to permit the investigation to continue. 138 Once
police hear or see suspects discussing retaliation for the drug theft, police
will need to move in promptly to arrest the suspects. 139 Even if police do not
detect evidence of retaliation, they nevertheless are aware that violent
retaliation is a very real danger-and the longer they wait to arrest the
suspects, the greater the risk of harm. 140
The upshot is that in many cases covert seizures which are properly
monitored to protect third parties will not enable law enforcement to both
seize the drugs and continue their investigation for any substantial period of
time. 141 The danger created by the covert seizure means that the
investigation will be able to continue only for an additional period of hours
or a few days. 142
If this is the case, then why are law enforcement officers conducting
high-risk covert search and seizures in the first place? What do law
enforcement officials hope to accomplish in such a short time?

Here it is worth clearly separating two different, but related, potential
law enforcement objectives when it comes to covert seizures. Consider a
drug investigation: First, investigators may seek to keep drugs off the street
while allowing the investigation to remain secret and thus to continue for
some additional period of time, in the hopes of developing more evidence or
identifying more participants. 143 Second, investigators may simply seek to
provoke the drug dealers into additional criminal activity- at a time when

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See id.
See discussion supra Part II.
See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 67.
See Cleveland Man, supra note 26.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See DNSW White Paper, supra note 111.
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they are under close police surveillance that will garner highly effective
evidence. 144
Starting with the first justification: Law enforcement officials
investigating complex criminal organizations, such as drug conspiracies, face
a serious challenge in identifying and gathering evidence against persons
higher up in the organization who do not directly handle drugs. 145 Law
enforcement officials thus resort to a variety of investigative techniques to
try to reach higher into an organization. 146 They install wiretaps in the hopes
of capturing communications with upper-level conspirators.147 They try to
"flip" low-level conspirators, pressuring them to wear a wire or otherwise
testify against higher-level members of the conspiracy in exchange for
reduced or dismissed charges. 148
A covert search or seizure is another possible tool. As described by the
DOJ, the benefit of a covert seizure is to permit investigators to prevent
drugs from reaching users-by seizing them-while the investigation is
ongoing. 149 Without the benefit of a covert seizure, police investigating a
144. See United States v. Miranda, 425 F.3d 953, 956 (11th Cir. 2005).
145. Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1326 (2003)
(noting that a key economic advantage of forming a large conspiracy is that "[t]hey can
reduce the probability of detection," including through specialization of roles, "where
the responsibility for a single crime is spread over many persons"; moreover, "those
insulated will be leaders, who orchestrate actions to maintain plausible deniability");
NORMAN W. PHILCOX, AN INTRODUCTION TO ORGANIZED CRIME 79 (1978) ("It is
difficult to obtain proof of organized crime violations insofar as the top command is
concerned. If and when they are identified it is often impossible to obtain documentary
evidence which can be used in court.").
146. See Katyal, supra note 145, at 1326.
147. In fact, under Title III one statutory requirement for obtaining a wiretap order
is demonstrating that other "procedures have been tried and failed or why they
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried," 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c), a
requirement commonly referred to as Title Ill's "necessity" requirement. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bennett, 219 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Zapata,
546 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 2008).
148. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 145, at 1329-32, 1339-40 (describing how conspiracy
law is used to flip co-conspirators and thereby extract information against other
conspirators); Mark J. Kadish, Rosalyn Suna Kadish & Alan J. Baverman, The
Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute: A Powerful Weapon for Federal Prosecutors, 19
TRIAL 66, 68 (1983) (describing how drug task forces use the Continuing Criminal
Enterprise statute "for leverage against mid-range defendants in a typical drug
conspiracy, in hopes of getting these defendants to 'flip' against others in the
'organization'").
149. See DNSW White Paper, supra note 111.
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complex drug conspiracy might be forced to permit known drug stashes to
be sold to consumers in order to allow the investigation to continue. 15°
Now consider the second justification: A covert seizure will often lead
the conspirators to plan, attempt, or carry out some type of violent
retribution. As seen in the examples above, they might agree to kill the
suspected thief or kidnap the storage warehouse manager. 151 That violent
retribution itself can then form the basis of additional, possibly more serious,
criminal charges against the suspect. 152 Instead of conducting a covert seizure
to keep the investigation ongoing, law enforcement may sometimes use
covert seizures to "poke the hornet's nest" -create alarm and panic among
the conspirators to provoke them into additional criminal conduct. 153
Moreover, this provoked criminal activity happens at a time known to the
police, and thus police are in a strong position to set up surveillance and
gather strong evidence of this criminal conduct. 154
This pattern is evident is some of the cases discussed earlier. 155 In the
Oregon case, for example, the defendants were never charged with the
underlying marijuana distribution offenses that motivated the initial
investigation and covert seizure. 156 Instead, they were only charged with
offenses related to their retaliation - kidnapping and brandishing a firearm
during a drug trafficking offense. 157 The firearm charges were particularly
damaging to the defendants, as they carry either a five-year or seven-year
mandatory minimum that must be imposed consecutively-in addition to
whatever punishment is given for the kidnapping. 158
The first tactic-permitting an investigation to continue in order to
discover more co-conspirators-has repeatedly been proffered by the
150. See id.
151. See Cleveland Man, supra note 26; United States v. Miranda, 425 F.3d 953, 956
(11th Cir. 2005).
152. See Miranda, 425 F.3d at 956.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See discussion supra Part IL
156. See United States v. Wafer, Docket No. 3:17-cr-00435 (D. Or. Dec. 05, 2017),
Court Docket (each defendant facing charges of (1) kidnapping, (2) using a firearm
during and in relation to a crime of violence, (3) conspiracy to use a firearm during and
in relation to a crime of violence, and (4) kidnapping and use of a firearm during and in
relation to a crime of violence).
157. See id.
158. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(i) (use); id.§ 924(c)(l)(A)(ii) (brandishing).
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government in defense of the practice of covert searching. 159 The second
tactic- triggering violent retaliation, in order to obtain more serious
charges-has not been mentioned in DOJ defenses of delayed notice search
warrants. 160 It is a hidden-but perhaps more common-reason to conduct a
covert seizure.
In some cases, it does appear that covert seizures can be conducted in
a manner that mirrors the DOJ's claims-allowing investigators to seize
evidence while continuing a complex investigation. 161 The Patel case,
discussed above, is one such example: the covert search and seizure occurred
in April 2011 and the conspirators were not arrested until August 2011. 162
But in other cases, such as the Oregon marijuana seizure and the Ohio
methamphetamine seizure, the danger of violent retaliation prompted law
enforcement to intervene and end the investigation very quickly. 163
In sum, covert seizures of physical evidence raise several interrelated
concerns. First, they give rise to the predictable danger that the targets of
the covert seizure will retaliate violently against innocent third parties. 164
Law enforcement officers are well aware of this risk, and that in tum gives
rise to the second and related concern over covert seizures-that law
enforcement officers are not using covert seizures as a way to prolong an
ongoing investigation, but as a way to provoke suspects into violent criminal
conduct. 165 Part IV turns to consider what limitations the Fourth
Amendment might place on this practice.
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON COVERT SEIZURES
The Fourth Amendment does not speak directly to the question of
whether police should be permitted to covertly enter a home, seize evidence

159. See DNSW White Paper, supra note 111; Counterterrorism Legislative Review:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of James
Corney, Deputy Att'y Gen. of the United States) (testifying that without delayed notice
search warrants, in some cases agents would be "forced to reveal the existence of the
investigation prematurely," which would result in "the flight of many of the targets" of
an investigation).
160. See DNSW White Paper, supra note 111.
161. See United States v. Patel, 579 F. App'x 449, 463-64 (6th Cir. 2014).
162. Id.
163. Cleveland Man, supra note 26; Bernstein, supra note 67.
164. See, e.g., Cleveland Man, supra note 26.
165. See, e.g., United States v. Miranda, 425 F.3d 953, 956 (11th Cir. 2005).
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or contraband, and then stage the scene to look like a burglary.166 Likewise,
the Supreme Court has never directly assessed the constitutionality of covert
seizures. 167 Evaluating whether this practice is constitutionally permissible
and if so, what Fourth Amendment limitations may exist-requires
considering the Fourth Amendment's history and first principles, including
the limited Supreme Court precedent that sets forth principles bearing on
this practice.
Delayed notice search warrants-warrants expressly authorizing
covert searches and seizures-are a relatively recent phenomenon. 168 There
is no evidence of this practice in the eighteenth century, 169 and as recently as
1966 an internal Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) memorandum
explained that covert search and seizure "involves trespass and is clearly
illegal; therefore, it would be impossible to obtain any legal sanction for
it." 170 The earliest reported judicial decision involving a delayed notice
warrant is from 1985. 171
One aspect of the fundamental structure of the warrant clause of the
Fourth Amendment is to interpose a neutral magistrate between the
government's investigative arm and its citizenry. 172 The warrant clause
enumerates several requirements-probable cause, oath or affirmation, and
particularity as to place searched and items seized. 173 In addition, however,
the Supreme Court has held that the "reasonableness" requirement of the
first clause of the amendment also imposes certain requirements for the
warrant process beyond those articulated in the second clause. 174 Most
166. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
167. See infra notes 186-89.
168. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3103a.
169. See Witmer-Rich, The Rapid Rise, supra note 52, at 559-70 (reviewing historical
record).
170. RONALD KESSLER, THE FBI 80 (1994) (reprinted in HENRY M. HOLDEN, FBI
100 YEARS: AN UNOFFICIAL HISTORY 215 (2008)).
171. See generally United States v. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. 1560, 1569 (N.D. Cal. 1985),
rev'd, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986).
172. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948) ("Absent some grave
emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and
the police. This was done ... so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade
that privacy in order to enforce the law.").
173. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
174. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (finding that to be
reasonable, inferences supporting a warrant must be "drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
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notably for present purposes, the Court in Wilson v. Arkansas held that
officers must notify the occupants of their presence and authority before
breaking open the door, absent a good reason to dispense with that
requirement. 175 Covert searches directly circumvent this general notice
requirement, and I have evaluated the constitutionality of covert searching
generally in earlier articles. 176
Focusing on covert seizures specifically, there is even less guidance
from the Court than exists for covert searches. Wilson did not involve a
covert search or seizure. 177 In Dalia v. United States, a case involving the
covert installation of a bugging device, the Court held "The Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit per se a covert entry performed for the
purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging equipment." 178 The
Court called the defendant's argument to the contrary "frivolous," noting it
had earlier stated that "officers need not announce their purpose before
conducting an otherwise [duly] authorized search if such an announcement
would provoke the escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical
evidence." 179 But Dalia did not involve a covert seizure and said nothing
about the unique risks involved in that practice. 180
While neither Wilson nor Dalia addressed covert seizures, the Court's
decision in Wilson set forth fundamental groundwork that bears on the
constitutionality of this practice. 181 Wilson articulated a variety of purposes
served by the common law requirement that officers executing warrants
announce their presence (give notice) and request admission before
breaking the door. 182 The Court quoted Semayne's Case, from 1603, for the
following "important qualification":

enterprise of ferreting out crime").
175. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) ("An examination of the common
law of search and seizure leaves no doubt that the reasonableness of a search of a
dwelling may depend in part on whether law enforcement officers announced their
presence and authority prior to entering.").
176. See generally Witmer-Rich, The Rapid Rise, supra note 52; Jonathan Witmer
Rich, The Fatal Flaws of the "Sneak and Peek" Statute and How to Fix It, 65 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 121 (2014) [hereinafter Witmer-Rich, The Fatal Flaws].
177. See generally Wilson, 514 U.S. at 930.
178. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 248 (1979).
179. Id. at 247-48 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1967)).
180. See Dalia, 441 U.S. at 247-48.
181. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929.
182. Id. at 935-36.
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But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming,
and to make request to open doors ... for the law without a default in
the owner abhors the destruction or breaking of any house (which is for
the habitation and safety of man) by which great damage and
inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no default is in him; for
perhaps he did not know of the process, of which, if he had notice, it is
to be presumed that he would obey it ... 183

The Supreme Court, in Wilson, thus recognized that the common law
"notice" requirement for executing warrants is designed in part to prevent
several types of harm. 184 The first is the simple physical damage to the home
caused by an unnecessary break-in. 185 Second, officers who break in without
prior notice cause "fear and dismay" to the occupants of the home. 186 Third,
an unannounced entry could provoke violent resistance from those surprised
occupants. 187

Wilson thus establishes several fundamental points. It makes clear that
the "reasonableness" of a search depends not only on whether a warrant is
issued properly, but also on the manner in which the search is carried out. 188
It also recognizes certain harms that can be created by unreasonable search
practices, and that reasonableness will be judged in part with an eye toward
avoiding those harms.189
As noted above, covert seizures similarly create risks of unnecessary
harm, albeit through somewhat different mechanisms. First, the practice of
covert seizure usually involves the police deliberately damaging property to
183. Id. at 931-32 (quoting Semayne's Case (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195-96 (KB);
5 Co. Rep. 91 a, 91 b).
184. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 935-36.
185. Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195-96 ("[G]reat damage and inconvenience
might ensue to the party" who, had he known of the process, might have obeyed it); see
also Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006).
186. Ratcliffe v. Burton (1802) 127 Eng. Rep. 123, 126 (KB) ("The law of England,
which is founded on reason, never authorizes such outrageous acts as the breaking open
every door and lock in a man's house without any declaration of the authority under
which it is done. Such conduct must tend to create fear and dismay, and breaches of the
peace by provoking resistance.").
187. Launock v. Brown (1819) 106 Eng. Rep. 482, 483 (KB) ("[H]ow is it possible
for a party to know what the object of the person breaking open the door may be? He
has a right to consider it as an aggression on his private property, which he will be
justified in resisting to the utmost."); Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594.
188. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934.
189. See id. at 935-36.
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leave the appearance of a burglary. 190 This is very similar to the unnecessary
property damage that Wilson's "notice" rule is designed to prevent. 191
Unlike a regular no-knock search, police executing a covert search and
seizure are unlikely to startle the occupants or provoke an immediate
reaction to their unannounced entry, as police deliberately choose a time
when they have very good reason to believe no occupant will be present. 192
But there is nonetheless a serious risk of harm created by the police desire
to bypass the conventional search approach- the harm that covert seizures
will incite the targets into violent retribution against others. 193
At a basic level, as Wilson recognizes, the Fourth Amendment "notice"
requirement is designed in part to prevent unnecessary violence. 194 The
practice of covert seizures, using a delayed notice warrant that expressly
authorizes covert entry and seizure, deviates from the ordinary notice
requirement, and in so doing gives rise to a risk of violence. 195 As such, the
core principles underlying the Fourth Amendment have direct bearing on
190. See, e.g., DeArmon v. Burgess, 388 F.3d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 2004) ("According to
appellants, the officers broke entry doors and locks on interior doors, damaged drywall
and furniture, and seized a firearm, doorknobs and locks, photographs, personal papers,
and jewelry."); United States v. Howard, 489 F.3d 484, 488 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding officers
"conduct[ed] the search of the vehicle to make it appear as though the vehicle had been
vandalized while it was left unattended on the side of the Thruway. They broke a pool
cue found in the back of the car, presumably belonging to the vehicle's occupants, and
used it to pry open the glove compartment, damaging the glove compartment and
making it appear as if there had been an attempted break-in."); United States v.
Miranda, 425 F.3d 953, 956 (11th Cir. 2005) ("By staging a burglary, the agents hoped to
precipitate activity within the Cuevas conspiracy that would provide additional evidence
of criminal conduct.").
191. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 935-36.
192. This danger of no-knock searches is well-documented and has resulted in the
deaths of many unsuspecting innocent persons, including Breonna Taylor. See, e.g.,
Radley Balko, The No-Knock Warrant for Breanna Taylor Was Illegal, WASH. POST
(June 3, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/03/no-knock
warrant-breonna-taylor-was-illegal/; Brian Dolan, Note, To Knock or Not to Knock?
No-Knock Warrants and Confrontational Policing, 93 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 201, 203-04
(2019) ("Between 2010 and 2016, at least ninety-four people died during the execution
of no-knock search warrants, thirteen of whom were police officers.") (citing Kevin Sack,
Door-Busting Drug Raids Leave a Trail of Blood, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2017),
https://www .nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/18/us/forced-entry-warrant-drug-raid.
html).
193. See, e.g., Cleveland Man, supra note 26.
194. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 935-36.
195. See Cleveland Man, supra note 26.
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covert seizures with delayed notice warrants, and courts should evaluate
whether and under what circumstances such seizures are "reasonable." 196
These basic Fourth Amendment principles suggest that for covert
seizures of physical property to be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, several things should be true.
First, law enforcement officers must consider whether and how the
covert seizure may lead to a risk of harm to other persons and have a plan
for how they will mitigate that risk.
Second, a technique that predictably gives rise to a serious risk of harm
to innocent third parties should be justified by very weighty government
interests, and not used anytime it seems that a covert seizure might be
convenient or turn something up. In particular, law enforcement desire to
provoke the defendant into threatening violent crime is not a sufficiently
weighty government interest to justify use of an exceptional type of
warrant-a delayed notice warrant-that risks the safety of innocent third
parties. The courts should recognize that a desire to provoke criminals into
a violent retaliation is not a permissible justification for obtaining warrant
authority for a covert seizure.
Finally, all of these additional considerations should be reviewed by
the judge issuing the delayed notice warrant, rather than simply left to law
enforcement with no judicial oversight or supervision.
One possible objection is that these requirements did not exist at the
time of the Founding and are not expressly written into the Fourth
Amendment. 197 That objection has little force, for the very practice of covert
search and seizure is itself a recent innovation. 198 There is no evidence of
lawfully recognized covert search and seizure-by warrant or otherwise-at
the time of the Founding or in decades after. 199 Thus, it could equally be
argued that because covert search and seizure was unknown in the 1790s,
this practice should be viewed as categorically "unreasonable" and
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 200
Both views are lacking. The fact that a search or seizure practice did
not exist in 1790 does not mean that it is categorically forbidden by the
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 935-36.
See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Witmer-Rich, The Rapid Rise, supra note 52, at 561-70.
Id.
See id.
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Fourth Amendment. Likewise, the fact that the Fourth Amendment does
not expressly forbid a particular search practice does not mean it is wholly
unregulated. The text of the Fourth Amendment is focused on whether
searches and seizures are "unreasonable" -a capacious standard that the
Court has repeatedly relied upon to craft both limitations and permissions
related to search and seizure. 201
Of course, the Fourth Amendment is not a general regulation of all
police investigative conduct. In particular, courts ordinarily defer to the
police on questions of tactics or strategy, so long as the execution of those
plans stays within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment. 202 Thus, for
example, police are free to "manufacture" exigent circumstances- approach
a drug house and announce the police presence, with hopes of triggering an
evasive response inside and thereby giving rise to an exigency that allows
them to enter without a warrant. 203 This is permissible so long as the police
do "not violate the Fourth Amendment or threaten to do so." 204
The mere fact that a particular investigative tactic creates risks or
seems unwise is not enough to render it a proper target of Fourth
Amendment regulation. There are circumstances in which it may be unwise
to use an undercover informant in a particular investigation, or unwise to
follow one lead rather than another. So long as none of those strategic and
tactical decisions constitute an unreasonable search or seizure, however, the

201. See, e.g., Kathryn R. Urbonya, Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices:
Viewing the Supreme Court's Multiple Discourse Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387,
1388-89 (2003) (identifying the multiple "discourse paths" employed by the Supreme
Court "to construct an evolving reasonableness standard," including a shift from a
warrant presumption to an "open-ended balancing standard"); I. Bennett Capers,
Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 44 (2011) ("The Fourth Amendment is capacious enough,
certainly under its reasonableness clause, to permit limited intrusions and non
discretionary searches even where the primary goal is law enforcement oriented.");
Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning ofthe Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARYL. REV.
197, 201, 229 (1993) (criticizing the Supreme Court for using an "ad hoc reasonableness
standard" and arguing that "the broad principle embodied in the Reasonableness Clause
is that discretionary police power implicating Fourth Amendment interests cannot be
trusted").
202. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 466 (2011) (criticizing lower court
rulings that "unjustifiably interfere[] with legitimate law enforcement strategies").
203. See id. at 465-66.
204. Id. at 455.
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Fourth Amendment leaves those decisions to law enforcement, not the
courts. 205
In the case of covert seizures, however, the police are using the warrant
itself-which is very clearly regulated by the Fourth Amendment-to trigger
the dangerous reaction from the targets. 206 Moreover, the police are seeking
judicial approval for a separate, special type of authority: the authority to
conduct a covert entry and then secretly seize evidence. 207 It is clear that
Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" depends in part on how officers
execute a warrant, including the ordinary requirement that officers
announce their authority and give notice of their search, absent some good
reason to depart from that practice. 208 Given that police are asking judges to
authorize a deviation from the constitutional norm -giving notice at the
time of a search and seizure-it is both appropriate and necessary for courts
to evaluate the reasons being given for that deviation, and to determine
whether this practice Greates some of the very types of harms the Fourth
Amendment is designed to prevent. 209 In light of the centrality of the warrant
to this process, courts should not shirk their obligation to ensure that the
search and seizure process with delayed notice warrants is "reasonable."
In light of the danger posed by covert seizures with delayed notice

warrants, a strong case can be made that the unfettered practice of covert
seizures would be an "unreasonable" search and seizure practice and would
violate the Fourth Amendment. 210 Part V turns to consider whether those
dangers can be sufficiently minimized so as to render the practice
constitutionally permissible in some cases.
V. USING THE WARRANT PROCESS TO REGULATE COVERT SEARCHING
The warrant process can serve to address some of the potential risks of
covert seizures. Currently, police seeking a delayed notice search warrant
must-of course-satisfy the regular warrant requirements, such as showing
probable cause. 211 In addition, police must satisfy a statutory standard if they

205.
206.
232.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

See generally id.
Witmer-Rich, When Cops 'Steal,' supra note 1; see Shumate, supra note 1, at
See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2); Shumate, supra note 1, at 203.
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995).
See id.
See discussion supra Part IV.
18 U.S.C. § 3103a(a).
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wish to turn that ordinary search warrant into a delayed notice warrant. 212
To convert an ordinary warrant to a delayed notice warrant, police must
show that executing the warrant and giving notice to the occupant at the time
of the search would have an "adverse result," defined as: (1) endangering
some person; (2) flight from prosecution; (3) destruction of evidence; (4)
witness intimidation; or (5) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an
investigation.213
Finally, police seeking to conduct a covert seizure during that covert
search must show "reasonable necessity" for the seizure. 214 Unfortunately,
this reasonable necessity standard does nothing to mitigate the risks of
covert seizures.21s
Reasonable necessity is an amorphous standard, and the statute
provides no further clarification of what type of showing is required. 216 In a
covert seizure, police ordinarily seek to seize drugs or some type of
dangerous contraband such as weapons. 217 If a covert search is being
conducted, it seems relatively easy for police to further demonstrate
reasonable necessity for the covert seizure. 218 Without a covert seizure, after
all, the drugs or guns might well enter the stream of commerce and cause
danger to the community. 219 Thus, the reasonable necessity standard seems
very easy for police to meet in most cases.
Of particular concern, nothing in the reasonable necessity standard, or
in the rest of the warrant application process, addresses the risk of harm to
third parties. 220
At the very minimum, then, police seeking authority for a covert
seizure should be required to state, in the warrant application, whether they
212. See id. § 3103a(b); id.§ 2705(a).
213. See id.§ 3103a(b)(l) (permitting a delayed notice warrant if giving notice "may
have an adverse result" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2705); id. § 2705(a)(2) (defining
"adverse result" as (A) "endangering the life or physical safety of an individual"; (B)
"flight from prosecution;" (C) "destruction of or tampering with evidence"; (D)
"intimidation of potential witnesses"; or (E) "otherwise seriously jeopardizing an
investigation...."). For criticism of this standard, see Witmer-Rich, The Fatal Flaws,
supra note 176, at 150-60.
214. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2).
215. Witmer-Rich, The Fatal Flaws, supra note 176, at 171.
216. Id. at 174-75.
217. See DNSW White Paper, supra note 111.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. Witmer-Rich, The Fatal Flaws, supra note 176, at 171-74.
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have reason to believe that conducting a covert seizure will create a risk of
harm to others, through retaliation or otherwise.
Once that danger is brought to the forefront, the second step is for
police to describe, in the warrant application, what steps will be taken to
mitigate that risk. This will require a law enforcement agency seeking a
warrant for a covert seizure to explicitly consider the danger to others and
pre-commit to what steps they will take to minimize that risk.
Finally, police should be required to explain why a covert search and
seizure is important to the investigation-that is to say, why this risky tactic
is being sought rather than simply raiding the location, arresting the suspects,
and seizing any evidence. Police thus should explain what particular
expected benefit will be gained by using a covert search and seizure rather
than the ordinary search and seizure process.
Once presented with this information in the affidavit, the magistrate
should then assess:
•

Whether the police plan to mitigate harm to others appears to
be reasonable in the circumstances, or whether additional
measures to protect the public might be necessary; and

•

Whether there is a sufficiently important government reason
for engaging in a covert search and seizure as opposed to an
ordinary search and seizure.

On the latter point, it should be stressed that simply provoking
additional criminal activity (in response to the covert seizure) is not a
sufficient reason to justify a covert search and seizure. Instead, law
enforcement should be required to demonstrate what additional
investigative benefit can be derived from a covert search and seizure, beyond
simply the chance of provoking more criminal activity.
A fundamental purpose of the warrant requirement is to protect the
security of individuals by interposing a neutral and detached magistrate
between the government's law enforcement apparatus and its citizenry. 221
Covert seizures with delayed notice search warrants give rise to uniquely
serious risks of harm to innocent persons. 222 Without adequate protections,
covert seizures appear to be "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment,
as they create a number of the types of dangers to property and to persons
221. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
222. See discussion supra Part III.
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that the Fourth Amendment seeks to prevent. 223 The requirements set forth
above would serve to mitigate those harms and thereby limit covert seizures
in a way that might render t~em constitutionally reasonable.

223. See discussion supra Part IV.

